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We study the relationship of sell-side analysts’ performance and their employment outcomes in 
the U.S. from 1983 to 2013. Analysts with a weak accuracy score are more likely to leave the 
job and less likely to experience a job-upgrade. Controlling for accuracy and experience, 
bolder and younger analysts are also more likely to experience job-termination. Additionally an 
Institutional Investors’ all-star has a lower chance of job-termination in case of a weak 
performance. Finally from 2003 onwards, after Wall Street’s regulation enforcement, 
employment outcome becomes less sensitive to an analyst’s past performance. 
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I. Introduction 
In the U.S., investment banks spend a great amount of money annually on equity 
research (e.g., Francis et al. (2004)), the latter used by investors to help making 
investment decisions (e.g., Madan et al. (2003)) and by firms to market their securities 
(e.g., Krigman et al. (2001)). In this sense, sell-side financial analysts have long been an 
important topic among academic researchers due to their key role in capital markets.
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Following Hong et al. (2000) we examine the impact of an analyst’s past 
performance and her employment outcome (e.g., Clement and Tse (2003)) for a sample 
of U.S. analysts from 1983 to 2013. We build sell-side analysts’ rankings for their 
accuracy and audacity levels, proxies for forecast performance, and set measures to 
define three possible career outcomes: job-termination, job-upgrade and job-downgrade. 
Overall, we find that forecast performance impacts an analyst’s likelihood of job-
termination more than being upgraded to a high-status bank. Our results come in line 
with previous literature that i) identify a positive relation between forecasting accuracy 
and promising career outcome (Clement (1999)); ii) consider that analysts producing 
bold forecasts, i.e. incur in ‘anti-herding’ behavior have a higher chance to experience 
job-termination (Hong et al. (2000)). Nevertheless, despite the statistical significance of 
the results, we find a decrease in the magnitude of the impact of analysts’ performance 
on their employment outcome. In accordance, we find that inaccurate and bold 
performers are less likely to leave the sample if they produce forecasts after the year of 
2003, namely after the implementation of the SEC regulations. Finally, and in line with 
previous literature, an analyst belonging to the group of all-stars has a lower chance of 
job-termination (Leone and Wu (2007)). 
                                                          
1 
When searching on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) eLibrary we obtain 2,245 results 
for papers in which the word “analyst” appears in the abstract, of which in 1,003 the combination of 
the words “analyst and earnings” is to be found.  
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Early research on sell-side analysts focused on the statistical properties of earnings 
forecasts (O’Brien (1988)) and its investment value (e.g., Womack (1996)). More 
recently, the impact of analyst forecasts behavior has become a topic of interest (e.g. 
Agrawal et al. (2006)). For instance, previous research studies the relation between the 
trading volume achieved by an investment bank and its analysts’ forecasting ability, or 
how a sell-side analyst’s performance influences analysts’ labor market concerns (e.g., 
Alford and Berger (1999), and Irvine (2004)). 
In addition, when assessing analysts’ performance, the consensus is that precision 
(i.e. accuracy) in forecasting is relevant (e.g., Gu and Wu (2003)). Analysts that are 
more precise, shift prices readily (e.g., Jackson (2005)), are acknowledged and 
compensated for their work (e.g., Stickel (1992)) and have greater chances of 
experiencing job-upgrade (e.g., Hong and Kubik (2003)). Mikhail et al. (1999) observe 
that analyst forecast accuracy is related with job change, indicating an association with 
remuneration. Though remuneration is not directly observed in I/B/E/S, we consider the 
relation between career outcomes and analysts’ job change across investment firms 
during our period of analysis (e.g., Holmstrom (1999)). 
First, we examine the impact of forecast accuracy on employment outcome. The 
labor market identifies an agent’s past accuracy as a key indicator of her ability. Thus 
analysts’ career prospects (i.e. job-termination or job-upgrade) rely upon this evaluation 
of ability and are subsequently related to an analyst’s past action. In line with Hong et 
al. (2000) we confirm that less accurate analysts have a higher chance of experiencing 
job-termination and a lower chance of being upgraded. 
Previous research also finds that forecast audacity (i.e. boldness) is an indicator of 
an analyst’s herding behavior and ability (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990)). Clement 
and Tse (2005) observe a greater accuracy for bolder analysts; and Bernhardt et al. 
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(2006) report results on analysts’ propensity to “anti-herding”. Other studies identify an 
analyst’s incentive to herd toward the consensus, either because the consensus is a good 
aggregator of private information (e.g., Jegadeesh and Kim (2009), and Welch (2000)), 
or because the analyst does not want to deviate from the norm (e.g., Hong et al. (2000)). 
When controlling for accuracy, we observe that analysts issuing bold forecasts 
have a higher likelihood of experiencing job-termination compared to analysts that herd. 
However, if an analyst is bold and experienced she is less likely to stop producing 
forecasts than young analysts. Our findings, despite in a smaller magnitude, are in line 
with previous literature that finds that an analyst incurring in a herding behavior has a 
higher chance of keeping her job and that experience influences an analyst’s incentives 
(Hong et al. (2000)). Interestingly, Clement and Tse (2005) find that forecasting 
audacity is an indicative of an analyst holding more private information, thus delivering 
greater reports to the buy-side of the market. Moreover, investment firms value analysts 
with a bold attitude when forecasting stocks, because it leads to a promotion of the 
stock, and consequently brings more money to the brokerage house the analyst works 
for (Michaely and Womack (1999)). Accordingly, we expected bold analysts to be less 
likely to leave the sample than herding analysts. However our results suggest a slight 
tendency for the opposite to happen, only when controlling for experience is forecasting 
audacity an asset. 
Furthermore we study the ‘all-stars’, i.e., the financial analysts ranked in the 
Institutional Investor magazine annual surveys from 1997 to 2013. The Institutional 
Investor’s rankings of financial analysts are considered a measure of analyst reputation 
(Krigman et al. (2001), and Cliff and Denis (2004)). Previous research demontrates that 
these rankings have a meaningful role in identifying high-status analysts in the labor 
market (Leone and Wu (2007)) and in determining analysts’ career concerns (e.g. 
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Stickel, 1992). Thus, we expect all-stars to have a greater career outcome than regular 
sell-side analysts. In the early 21
st
 century Hong and Kubik (2003) study the likelihood 
of job-downgrade for all-stars. Their most relevant findings are that a weak forecasting 
accuracy has a minor impact on the likelihood of job-downgrade for all-stars. We 
analyze the likelihood of job-termination on our I/B/E/S analysts including a subsample 
of all-stars. Despite the different career outcome, since our dependent variable is an 
analyst experiencing job-termination, we too observe that all-stars’ career concerns, i.e. 
likelihood of job-termination is less sensitive to past forecast performance. 
Finally, our period of study covers the enforcement of several settlements on the 
Wall Street capital market. For instance, on October, 2000, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) agreed on a set of ‘fair disclosure’ rules; on April, 2003, 
the SEC, NASD, NYSE, and the top U.S. largest investment firms accorded to an 
enforcement agreement to address issues of conflict of interest within their businesses. 
These rules intend to stop the act of selective disclosure, whereby firms give Wall Street 
analysts and large shareholders information in advance (e.g., Agrawal et al. (2006), 
Cohen et al. (2010)).
2
 Previous literature has focused on the impact of the new 
regulation on sell-side analysts’ decision-making, company coverages and forecast 
production, due to the change in the information flow on Wall Street (Jorion et al. 
(2005)). Thus, it is likely that as analyst performance is influenced by the disclosure 
rules, an analyst’s career outcome is indirectly impacted. In this sense, we break our 
analysis in sub-periods and examine the relationship between forecast performance and 
employment outcome (i.e. job-termination and job-upgrade) before and after the 
implementation of the SEC regulations. We find evidence of a declining importance of 
an analyst’s forecasting accuracy and audacity regarding job-termination. After the year 
                                                          
2
 The analyst regulations, issued between 2000 and 2003, include Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg 
FD), NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and Regulation Analyst Certification (Reg AC), 
culminating in the Global Settlement of 2003 (Barniv et al. (2009)). 
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of 2003 less accurate and bolder analysts are less likely to experience job-termination 
compared with the earliest period. In addition, we observe a growing importance of 
forecast audacity regarding job-upgrade for the period after the implementation of the 
regulations. 
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Section II, we describe 
the data. In Section III we construct the measures for employment outcome and forecast 
behaviors, reputation and bias. Section IV presents our empirical results. In Section V 
we conclude. 
 
II. Data 
We export from I/B/E/S Detail History File analysts’ earnings forecasts of U.S. 
firms between 1983 and 2013. We observe forecasts of roughly 18,500 sell-side 
individual analysts, employed in about 850 investment banks and covering 17,600 
firms. The I/B/E/S Detail History File assigns an exclusive numerical code to all 
individual security analysts and investment firms. We use these codes to track both 
earnings forecasts and job-background of the analysts in I/B/E/S. 
Every year in October the Institutional Investor, a U.S. finance magazine, releases 
a ranking (i.e. first, second, third and runner-ups) indicating the U.S. sell-side analysts 
that achieved the highest performance for the different industries and sectors in a year. 
These ranking reflects the voting of buy-side analysts and portfolio managers on the 
performance of their counterparts. Sell-side analysts are assessed on several attributes 
that serve as proxies for their yearly accomplishments, including accuracy and optimism 
bias. In order to compare this group of strong-performers with our I/B/E/S analysts we 
hand collected the names of the All-America Research Team analysts, also referred as 
all-stars, and tracked them on I/B/E/S. 
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The I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations File encompasses analyst-by-analyst 
recommendations for a security. Moreover, the Detail Recommendations File also 
provides two variables that indicate, respectively, the first initial and last name of the 
analysts, and the institution’s identity in the database.
3
 This information allows us to 
determine the names of the sell-side analysts that appear on the Institutional Investor’s 
All-America Research Team and the brokerage house they work for between 1997 and 
2013. We analyze the estimates of about 2000 all-stars. 
Analysts in our sample follow about 10 firms in a year, with a standard deviation of 
10 firms. Across the sample we observe that analysts usually follow companies from the 
equivalent industry group. We use the Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) industry codes, supplied by COMPUTSTAT, to classify the companies 
on our sample. The GICS industry code categorizes companies into four different 
partitions: sectors, industry groups, industries and sub-industries. In our sample period 
we identify 51 sectors, 61 industry groups, 84 industries, and 117 sub-industries. By 
assigning firms to a GICS industry code, we allocate each analyst to an industry 
according to the firms she covers. According to Boni and Womack (2006) partition 
based on the GICS codes is a reasonable proxy for analysts’ specialization by industry. 
The GICS classifications account for stock return co-movements, cross-sectional 
variations in valuation-multiples, forecasted and realized growth rates, and key financial 
ratios better than other classification schemes Bhojraj et al. (2003). In our dataset, 
investment firms cover on average 3 industry groups, with a standard deviation of 4. 
The maximum industry groups an institution covers is 16. Analysts cover on average 
only 1 industry, with a standard deviation of 0.5. The maximum number of industries an 
analyst covers in our sample period is 5 industries. 
                                                          
3
Thomson Reuters no longer provides the Broker and Analyst Translation files used by previous 
papers (Clarke et al. (2007)) to translate broker and analyst codes to actual names. 
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Overall, we analyze the estimates of 31,982 security analysts’. On average an 
analyst stays in our sample for 8 years, with a standard deviation of about 5 years. Only 
13 analysts remain in our database for the whole 30-year period. The 90th percentile is 
15 years, and the 10th percentile is 3 years. We find that analysts leave our sample for 
the following reasons: 1) the analyst leaves the job; 2) the analyst changes to a company 
not present in I/B/E/S; 3) the analyst works for a brokerage house that stops submitting 
analysts’ forecasts to I/B/ES. In any case, we only consider analysts with a three-year 
minimum of forecast history in I/B/E/S because it better proxies for forecasting ability 
(Hong et al. (2000)). 
With the individual analyst’s earnings forecasts gathered from I/B/E/S, we are able 
to construct the key variables to examine analyst's performance. We assess an analyst’s 
career evolution by creating the necessary indicators of job changes and job-
termination. Secondly we construct measures of their performance based on the 
produced earnings forecasts, since past performance is considered a determinant of an 
analyst’s career outcome. Hence, in the following section we discuss how to construct 
the forecast accuracy and audacity measures for each analyst, proxies for analysts’ 
precision and bias, respectively; and how we identify analysts’ job-termination, 
upgrades or downgrades. 
 
III. Methodology 
In this section we present the dimensions for employment outcome, forecast 
accuracy and audacity. 
A. Measures of Employment Outcome 
We first construct proxies for analysts’ career outcomes. Over the period security 
analysts produce and submit forecasts to the I/B/E/S, however this database does not 
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provide each analyst’s individual career path throughout their activity. To determine 
whether the analyst has left her job, has been upgraded or downgraded we track in the 
database if an analyst stops producing earnings forecasts or changes to a different 
brokerage house. 
A.1. Job-Termination 
Our sample of analysts only comprises sell-side analysts. Most security analysts in 
the U.S. produce earnings forecasts and submit their forecasts to I/B/E/S (e.g., Peterson 
and Peterson (1995), and Hong et al. (2000)). Generally, sell-side analysts strive to be 
part of the Institutional Investors All-American Research Team (e.g., Leone and Wu 
(2007), and Boris et al. (2011)), while buy-side analysts’ aspiration is to become a 
mutual fund manager. Thus, it is unlikely that a sell-side analyst will leave her job to 
obtain a new job on the buy side (e.g, Stickel (1992), and Nocera (1997)). Hereafter, we 
assume an analyst producing forecasts in year 𝑡, yet no longer producing forecasts to 
I/B/E/S in year 𝑡 + 1, is considered to experience job-termination in year 𝑡 + 1. The 
number of analysts leaving jobs per year is around 345. If we consider two different 
periods, before and after 2003, we obtain an average of 333 analysts leaving the sample 
from 1985 to 2003; thereafter the number of analysts leaving the sample per year is on 
average 373 analysts. 
A.2. Upgrade & Downgrade 
We consider the changes of the analysts between investment firms to define other 
possible career outcomes besides job-termination. By looking at the features of the 
investment firms the analyst is working on, before and after changing job, we determine 
whether an analyst experiences job-downgrade or job-upgrade. We assume that the most 
prominent investment firms have a higher number and more diversified base of clients 
compared to other investment firms. Hence, high-status investment firms employ more 
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analysts to cover all sectors and respective firms. In contrast, small investment firms 
naturally employ fewer analysts, since these tend to only represent regional companies 
or focus on a particular sector, having therefore a targeted and reduced set of clients. 
The proxy for the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house per year is 
the number of analysts on I/B/E/S producing forecasts for each individual investment 
bank. We consider that an analyst is upgraded (downgraded) in case she serves an 
investment bank in year 𝑡 employing less (more) than 25 analysts and changes in year 
𝑡 + 1 to an investment bank with a minimum (a maximum) of 25 analysts. Depending 
on the status of the investment bank in which the analyst works, we have two 
employment outcome dimensions. An analyst’s upgrade when she moves from a low-
status bank to a high-status bank and downgrade if the opposite situation is to observe.  
In this 30-year period on average an investment bank enlists around 18 analysts. If 
we divide our sample in two periods, we observe in the first half of our sample a mean 
of 19 analysts per institution, as in our most recent sub-period, on average, 17 analysts 
work for a brokerage house. In addition, an investment bank at the bottom 20% of the 
distribution has around 3 analysts in activity, whereas a bank at the 80
th
 and 90
th
 
percentiles employs on average 23 and 42 analysts, respectively. Thus, we consider the 
cut-off of 25 analysts an acceptable number to represent the proxy for high-status 
companies over our period of analysis. In Figure I we present further descriptive 
statistics of the features of the brokerages and the number of analysts that works for the 
latter. 
Finally, for the period between 1985 and 2013, on average, per year, 29 analysts 
are downgraded, while 33 analysts are upgraded. If we divide our sample in two 
subperiods, i.e., after and before the year of 2003, we observe a slight change in these 
numbers. Before 2003 the average downgrades per year affects around 27 security 
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analysts while, after 2003 the downgrades increase to a 35.5-average per year. In respect 
to upgrades, the average per year increases from about 28 to roughly 38 analysts in the 
second half of our period of study. 
 
Figure I 
Features of Investment Banks over Time 
Panel A presents the number of investment banks in I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2013. Panel B 
presents the values for the average, median, 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the sell-side analysts 
working for the investment banks in I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2013. The cut-off value in Panel B is 
25 and is indicative of our definition for a high-status bank. An investment bank employing 
more than 25 analysts in a given year is considered a high-status bank.  
 
Panel A: Brokerage Houses in I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2013 
 
Panel B: Analysts working for a Brokerage House in I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2013 
 
B. Measures of Performance 
We consider the earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S Detail File to measure analyst 
performance along two main dimensions that reflect both analyst reputation and bias: 
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The earnings forecast accuracy as a proxy for analyst reputation; the earnings forecast 
audacity as a proxy for bias. 
Analyst reputation and bias are company and industry dependent. Thus, if in a 
given year, we confront an analyst’s average forecast error to the one of all the other 
analysts in the sample we may obtain inaccurate results, because the predictability of 
earnings for some companies, depending on the industry or on the coverage invested, is 
easier than others. Following Hong et al. (2000), we use a scoring methodology to 
construct annual performance scores. 
B.1. Forecast accuracy 
We build a yearly performance ranking with basis on analysts’ forecast accuracy in 
order to observe individual analyst’s precision over the companies she follows. There 
are several alternative measures of sell-side analysts’ performance. We define 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 as 
the most updated earnings per share forecast produced by analyst 𝑖 on company 𝑗 for 
year 𝑡; and 𝐴𝑗,𝑡 as the realized earnings per share of the same firm 𝑗. We consider the 
absolute variation between the forecasted and the realized earnings per share our 
measure of analysts’ forecast accuracy for company 𝑗 in year 𝑡: 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =  |𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑗,𝑡| (1) 
On average, an analyst examines more than one company in a given year. Thus, we 
collect, for each company she follows in a year, the forecasting accuracy error. 
Thereafter, an option would be to compare the average forecast accuracy error of the 
analysts producing earnings forecasts in the same year. However, most analysts focus 
on distinct companies, distinct business sectors and not all companies are equally easy 
to predict. Instead, based on the forecast accuracy errors we sort the analysts by 
company 𝑗 and assign a rank based on the error. The analyst with the smallest forecast 
accuracy error is the most accurate analyst, thus receiving a rank of one. If there is a tie, 
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meaning that two or more analysts have the same accuracy level, we appoint to the 
analysts the mean value of their position in the ranking. According to this system, 
independently of the forecast accuracy errors analysts achieve for different firms, the 
analyst yielding the most precise forecast for company X has the same accuracy rank as 
the analyst yielding the most precise forecast of company Y. 
We could assume that an analyst averaging lower ranking scores (e.g. 1 or 2 out of 
56) across the companies she follows is a greater forecaster. Nevertheless, this average 
score might be unsuitable, since the position in the rank an analyst gets for company j is 
dependent on the amount of analysts producing forecasts for the same company j. If a 
company is thinly covered, regardless of the forecast accuracy error value, analysts 
covering that company have a higher chance of a low ranking position compared to 
analysts producing forecasts for companies with high coverage. Therefore, the ultimate 
score an analyst gets for a company she covers relies on the total analysts covering the 
company. Hence, we scale the analyst’s ranking position by the number of analysts with 
focus on the same company. The equation of the overall score adapting for the 
differences in coverage is 
 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 100 − [
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
] × 100. (2) 
The 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is the total amount of analysts following and producing 
forecasts of company 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Before computing this score, we define the criteria that 
at least four analysts mu cover a company 𝑗 for it to be considered in our study. The 
scores go from zero, for the least accurate analyst, to one hundred, for the analyst with 
the rank of one.  
After calculating analysts’ scores for all the companies, we estimate a final score to 
consider as proxy for an analyst's forecast accuracy. To simply consider the mean of the 
analyst's scores in a year is a noisy measure for those who cover few companies in a 
13 
 
given year. Thus, our final measure of forecast accuracy is the mean of an analyst’s 
accuracy score in year 𝑡, 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2. Thus, the analyst has to submit forecasts to 
I/B/E/S for at least three year, for the forecast accuracy dimension to be estimated. The 
highest the overall score the better the analyst’s forecast accuracy. This is a reasonable 
measure for estimating performance and reputation; however we need to be aware of its 
limitations. Some analysts, independently of the accuracy, have a higher chance of 
extreme mean scores. For instance, one strong or weak forecast decision on a company 
largely affects an analyst’s average score if she covers a small number of companies 
over the period considered. Likewise, analysts producing forecasts of thinly followed 
companies more easily get a score close to the top or bottom of the ranking, because 
these companies are covered by few analysts. 
B.2.Measure of Forecast Audacity 
The evidence of herding is based on comparing analysts’ forecasts to the 
consensus, with movements toward the consensus labeled as herding and movements 
away from the consensus labeled as audacity (i.e. bold decisions). To build the measure 
of the analyst's forecast audacity, we consider an identical method to our previously 
computed accuracy indicator. We first compute the average forecast of the analysts, 
except analyst 𝑖, following security 𝑗 in year 𝑡 as 
 ?̅?−𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐹𝑚,𝑗,𝑡
𝑚∈−𝑖
  (3) 
In the above equation −𝑖 is the sample of all analysts, with the exception of analyst 
𝑖, estimating forecasts for company 𝑗 in year 𝑡, and 𝑛 is the total number of analysts in 
– 𝑖. Thus, the forecast audacity error is the absolute variation of an analyst’s 𝑖 earnings 
forecast and all the other analysts’ averaged forecasts of the same company 𝑗 in year 𝑡:  
 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = |𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − ?̅?−𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|. (4) 
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We replicate the ranking methodology used in the previous subsection: We rank 
the analysts following a company 𝑗 in a given year 𝑡 depending on their forecast 
audacity errors. The bolder the analyst is, the greater (in absolute value) her earnings 
forecasts, meaning she deviates more from the average forecasts. We then compute the 
forecast audacity score as in Equation (2). The score is zero for the analyst producing 
forecasts for a company closer to the consensus value, and one hundred for the analyst 
that deviates the most from the average forecasts, i.e. produces the most biased 
forecasts. We finally compute for the analyst her overall audacity score, as the mean of 
the analyst's audacity scores in years 𝑡, 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2. This procedure is an acceptable 
method that proxies for bias, yet the same cautions arise in computing this dimension as 
in the forecast accuracy measure. 
 
IV. Results 
With our dimensions of employment outcome and forecast performance, we now 
observe the impact of past forecast behavior on an analyst’s career outcome. 
A. Relationship between employment outcome and forecast behavior 
Starting in the early nineties, the growing notoriety of security analysts on the 
financial markets has called for the financial press and regulators attention mostly 
regarding analysts’ career concerns. For instance, analysts are indicted of releasing 
favorable coverages (e.g., Schroeder and Smith (2002)) and compromising the precision 
of their predictions (e.g., Kane (2001)) in order to comply with possible brokerage 
houses and companies. Contrastingly, Clarke et al. (2007) find no direct evidence that 
an analysts’ over-optimistic behavior is due to affiliations between financial institutions. 
Moreover, Brown et al. (2013) find that issuing forecasts below the average leads to an 
increase of analysts’ credibility among clients, and not a change in their compensation.  
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Figure II 
Forecast Performance and Job-Termination 
Panel A presents the yearly average, the 5
th
 and the 95
th
 percentiles of the forecast accuracy and 
audacity scores from 1986 to 2013. The sample comprises analysts with a minimum of three-
years of experience in producing forecasts to I/B/E/S. The scores are computed as the mean of 
each analyst’s score in years 𝑡, 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2.  A score close to zero indicates an analyst’s weak 
performance; a score close to one hundred reveals the most accurate and bold forecasters in our 
sample. Panel B presents the yearly percentage of security analysts in I/B/E/S that experience 
job-termination from 1986 to 2013; and the period averaged percentage of analysts experiencing 
job-termination. An analyst is considered to be leaving her job if she is in I/B/E/S in a given 
year, and is no longer in I/B/E/S in the next year.  
 
Panel A: Evolution of the forecast performance scores from 1986 to 2013 
 
Panel B: Evolution of I/B/E/S analysts’ job-terminations from 1986 to 2013 
 
In Figure II we present some descriptive statistics for the performance measures 
and job-termination of our sample of analysts. Panel A presents the average value and 
the top and bottom percentiles for the forecast accuracy and audacity measures. We 
observe that for the period between 1985 and 2013 the average performance scores 
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remain relatively steady. For our sample period, the mean for the forecast accuracy 
performance is 50.12 (analysts’ scores range between 0 and 100) with a standard 
deviation of about 8 points. The score values for the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the 
accuracy score are 38.21 and 62.50, respectively. For the forecast audacity score the 
mean value is 49.68, standard deviation around 9, while the 25
th
 percentile takes the 
score value of 35.71, and finally the 63.82 is the score that indicates the 75
th
 percentile 
of the audacity score. The sum of the analysts no longer producing forecasts in year 
𝑡 + 1 divided by the total analysts submitting forecasts in year 𝑡 indicates the likelihood 
of job-termination. We compute the likelihood of job-upgrade (downgrade) by dividing 
the number of analysts working for a brokerage with fewer (more) than 25 analysts in 
year 𝑡 that changed to a brokerage with more (fewer) than 25 analysts in year 𝑡 + 1 by 
the total number of analysts producing forecasts in year 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. Panel B presents the 
percentage of analysts that stopped producing forecasts throughout our period of 
analysis. We observe that the percentage of analysts experiencing job-termination does 
not follow a constant path, for instance in the year of 1997 only 2% of the analysts in 
our sample stopped producing forecasts as in 2003 almost 20% of the analysts 
experienced job-termination. Averaging across our sample period, the likelihood of an 
analyst leaving the job is 10.6%. Additionally, the likelihood of an analyst in our sample 
being upgraded is about 1.6%, and the probability of being downgraded is 1%. 
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B. Employment outcome and forecast accuracy 
Next we present the regression that relates employment outcome with forecast 
accuracy: 
 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 =
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
(
(5) 
where 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 indicates whether analyst 𝑖 stops producing 
forecasts or is upgraded in year 𝑡 + 1. The 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 indicates the analyst’s 
past forecast accuracy in year 𝑡; 𝛽1 sizes the impact of past forecast accuracy on the 
likelihood of experiencing employment outcome the next year. Since our number of 
job-downgrades is reduced, further on we focus only on the relationship between past 
forecast behaviors and, job-upgrade or job-termination.  
We also include dummies in our specification to control for possible biases in the 
estimations, such as the type and number of companies tracked over the period of 
analysis. We control for the 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 of the companies followed by 
the analyst and for the number of companies the analyst follows – 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡. Additionally, we also include dummies for the 
𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 present in our 
sample. 
Table I reports our results for this regression. In columns (1) and (2) the 
employment outcome measure identifies if the analyst leaves the job. The estimate in 
column (1) is a dummy variable for the analysts in the 5
th
 percentile of the accuracy 
score in year 𝑡. Thus, this variable sizes the likelihood of less accurate analysts leaving 
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our sample in comparison with the remainder of the sample. In column (1) the estimate 
suggests that less accurate analysts (5
th
 percentile) have a probability about 1.7 
percentage points higher, of leaving their job compared to their fellows in the sample. 
This indicator is statistically and economically significant. Averaging for our sample 
period, the likelihood of an analyst leaving the sample is of 10.6% (recall Figure II); 
being in the 5
th
 percentile of the accuracy score increases the likelihood of leaving the 
sample by around 2%. 
 
Table I 
Forecast Accuracy and the Likelihood of Employment Outcome 
This table presents records for the impact of analysts’ past forecast accuracy on their future 
employment outcome. We consider analysts’ past earnings forecasts to compute the forecast 
accuracy score. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is job-termination - analysts stop 
producing forecasts to I/B/E/S in the year to follow. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent 
variable is job-upgrade – analysts move to a high-status brokerage in the year to follow. The 
regression is Equation (5). The standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
  
Forecast Accuracy Ranking 
 
Job-Termination 
  
Job-Upgrade 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Accuracy (bottom 5%) .0174** .0129*   -.0053 -.0072* 
 
(.0079) (.0074) 
 
(.0035) (.0037) 
5th through 10th percentile 
 
.0104 
  
-.0047* 
 
 
(.0071) 
  
(.0028) 
10th through 25th percentile 
 
.0099 
  
-.0040* 
 
 
(.0068) 
  
(.0024) 
25th through 50th percentile 
 
.0073 
  
-.0034 
 
 
(.0056) 
  
(.0021) 
50th through 75th percentile 
 
-.0034 
  
-.0009 
 
 
(.0049) 
  
(.0021) 
Observations 31,982 31,982   28,590 28,590 
 
We introduce in column (2) new variables that indicate an analyst's position in the 
forecast accuracy ranking. These estimates size the probability of an analyst, in a given 
position of the rank, leaving the job compared to analysts who score on the top 25
th
 
percentile of the score. Once more, we observe that the analysts with a low accuracy 
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score have a higher likelihood of leaving the job. In fact, analysts in the bottom 5% of 
the ranking are nearly 1.3% more likely to leave the job than their most accurate 
counterparts. As we go up on the score distribution, our estimates decrease and lose 
significance, meaning that the analyst is less likely to leave the job, yet larger effects are 
clearer in the bottom range of the accuracy ranking. 
In columns (3) and (4) we consider job-upgrade as our employment outcome 
measure. The coefficient in column (3) indicates the impact of a score in the 5
th
 
percentile of the forecast accuracy ranking on the possibility of job-upgrade. We 
observe that weak accuracy performance leads to a fall in the likelihood of job-upgrade 
by around 0.5%, although not statistically significant. We introduce in column (4) the 
variables that indicate an analyst’s position in the accuracy ranking as we do in column 
(2). We observe that as we go up in the accuracy score, an analyst is more likely to be 
upgraded, yet there is no significant variation when analyzing the middle sets of the 
accuracy ranking. An analyst scoring low in accuracy is nearly 1 percentage point less 
likely to be upgraded than her counterparts in the 75
th
 percentile of the accuracy 
ranking. Our study comprises a limited sample of job-upgrades, notwithstanding we are 
able to observe an influence of past forecast accuracy on an analyst’s likelihood of job-
upgrade. 
Ultimately, even if analysts’ compensation is influenced by other factors besides 
forecast accuracy, in order to remain on top of the business, analysts need to be known 
for forecasting expertise among the buy-side, and brokerage house directors are aware 
of this fact when mapping their employees’ forthcoming career (e.g., Holmstrom 
(1999)). Our outcomes are in line with this previous career-outcome studies that prove 
that weak accuracy performance origins a revised appraisal of an agent's ability to 
forecast and the likelihood of leaving the job or simply not progress in her career. 
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Although the results indicate that more accurate forecasters are rewarded, this effect is 
not symmetric. The impact is larger for extremely weak-accuracy analysts.  
C. Employment outcome, forecast accuracy and experience  
A further conclusion of several career-outcome studies is that employment 
outcome is related to an agent’s experience (e.g., Mikhail et al., 1999, and Hong and 
Kubik, 2003)). In this sense we now control for experience. 
Thus, we have no information about the number of years an analyst works in the 
sell-side market. We introduce a dummy variable entitled 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, this is one if the 
analyst in a given year 𝑡 produces forecasts to I/B/E/S for a minimum of four years and 
zero if the analyst has three or less years of experience.
4
 For instance the probability of 
an analyst being experienced, i.e., being in our sample for more than 3 years, is about 
83%. Moreover, only 3% of the analysts in our sample have more than 10 years of 
experience, while only 14 analysts are in the sample from 1985 to 2013.  
We estimate the impact of weak accuracy on the likelihood of employment 
outcome for both experienced and inexperienced analysts. We add to the regression of 
Equation (5), the experience dummy variable and an interaction of experience and 
forecast accuracy. 
In column (1) of Table II, we consider as the dependent variable stopping the 
production of earning forecasts. As observed before, an analyst performing in the 5
th
 
percentile of the accuracy score has a higher chance of leaving our sample than their 
counterparts. An analyst in the bottom 5% of the forecast accuracy score is 1.8 
percentage points more likely to leave the sample than their counterparts. Else, the 
coefficient of the experience variable is negative, implying that an old analyst has a 
lower probability of leaving her job than a younger one. Hence, this term is not 
                                                          
4
 An analyst must be producing forecasts for at least three years for the measure of forecast accuracy 
to be computed. 
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statistically significant. At last, the interaction term presents a coefficient that indicates 
a higher likelihood for inexperienced analysts to stop producing forecasts after 
performing weakly compared to their older counterparts. If an analyst has a low 
accuracy score in a given year but is experienced, she is about 3 percentage points less 
likely to leave the sample than a young analyst scoring low. This coefficient is 
statistically significant. Thus, performing weakly greatly affects the chance of job-
termination for a young analyst.  
 
Table II 
Forecast Accuracy, Experience and the Likelihood of Employment Outcome 
This table presents records for the impact of analysts’ past forecast accuracy and experience on 
their future employment outcome. We consider analysts’ past earnings forecasts to compute the 
forecast accuracy score. We consider the number of years an analyst is producing forecasts to 
I/B/E/S as an indicator of her experience. In column (1) the dependent variable is job-
termination - analysts stop producing forecasts to I/B/E/S in the year to follow. In column (2) 
the dependent variable is job-upgrade – analysts move to a high-status brokerage in the year to 
follow. The regression is Equation (5). The standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
  
Job-Termination 
 
Job-Upgrade 
 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Accuracy (bottom 5%) .0180***  -.0072*** 
 
(.0048)  (.0020) 
Experience -.0052  -.0034 
 
(.0158)  (.0066) 
Accuracy × experience -.0327*  .0081 
 
(.0182)  (.0057) 
Observations 31,982  28,590 
 
In column (2), we re-estimate the regression, considering job-upgrade as our 
dependent variable. The coefficient of interaction indicates that if an experienced 
analyst presents a weak accuracy score, she is about 1% more likely to be upgraded than 
her inexperienced counterparts that also present a weak score in accuracy. Thus, this 
coefficient has no statistical significance. 
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We conclude that perceiving an analyst’s forecast accuracy is relevant for her 
career outcome: analysts with weak forecast accuracy have a greater likelihood of job-
termination and are less likely to experience job-upgrade. In addition, only considering 
the group of low-accuracy analysts, experience reduces the likelihood of terminating 
their career; however it has a small impact on the probability of job-upgrade. The next 
step is to look at the relation of employment outcomes and forecast audacity. 
D. Employment outcome, forecast accuracy, experience and audacity 
In order to analyze the influence of past forecast audacity of analysts on the 
likelihood of employment outcome we introduce to the regression of Equation (5) two 
modifications: 
 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 =
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
(6) 
The 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the analysts in the 95
th
 
percentile of the forecast audacity score, meaning that the analyst produces bold 
forecasts in year 𝑡. The 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are dummies to indicate where the 
analyst ranks in the forecast accuracy score.
5
 𝛽1 measures the sensitivity of analysts’ 
employment outcome to forecast audacity, depending on an analyst's forecast accuracy 
score. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The categories for these dummies are equal to the ones in the regressions of Table I in columns (2) 
and (4). 
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Table III 
Forecast Audacity, Experience and the Likelihood of Employment Outcome 
This table presents records for the impact of analysts’ past forecast audacity and experience on 
their future employment outcome. We consider analysts’ past earnings forecasts to compute the 
forecast audacity score. We consider the number of years an analyst is producing forecasts to 
I/B/E/S as an indicator of her experience. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is job-
termination - analysts stop producing forecasts to I/B/E/S in the year to follow. In columns (3) 
and (4) the dependent variable is job-upgrade – analysts move to a high-status brokerage in the 
year to follow. The regression is Equation (6). The standard errors are in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
Job-Termination 
  
Job-Upgrade 
   (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Audacity (top 5%) .0106 .0317*   -.0048 -.0011 
 
(.0099) (.0165) 
 
(.0044) (.0071) 
Experience  
-.0001 
  
.0062 
  
(.0088) 
  
(.0050) 
Audacity × experience 
 
-.0120*** 
  
.0060 
 
 
(.0048) 
  
(.0081) 
Observations 31,982 31,982   28,590 28,590 
 
The estimates in column (1) and (2) of Table III reflect the impact of analysts’ 
audacity on job-termination. In column (2) we distinguish between experienced and 
inexperienced analysts. The coefficient in column (1) indicates that an analyst’s 
audacity has a positive effect on the likelihood of an analyst’s job-termination; however 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
In column (2), we observe that having a high audacity score and being 
inexperienced has an impact on the likelihood of job-termination. In our sample, a 
young analyst with a bold forecast score has a 3%-higher chance of leaving the job than 
older analysts. Hence, this effect disappears as analysts gain experience. Being bold but 
experienced reduces the chances of an analyst leaving the sample by more than 1 
percentage point. This coefficient is statistically significant.  
We replicate the same regression in column (1) and (2), with ‘moving to a high-
status bank’ as the dependent variable. The coefficients in column (3) and (4) are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that an analyst’s past forecast audacity has a reduced 
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impact on the likelihood of job-upgrade. When we add the experience factor and the 
interaction term in column (4) we observe a change in the sign of the coefficients, but 
again the estimates do not have statistical significance.  
The combination of being audacious and young expands the chances of job-
termination, but it does not have an impact on the probability of being upgraded. 
Overall, in comparison to older analysts, inexperienced analysts face a greater chance of 
job-termination for inaccurate and audacious performance.  
We further analyze other interaction terms of forecast accuracy, audacity and 
experience on an analyst’s probability of job-termination. The interaction terms are built 
based on the previously studied variables: the top 5% audacity score indicator, the 
bottom 5% and top 5% accuracy score indicator, and experience. We find that being 
simultaneously audacious and accurate, has no impact on an analyst’s chance of 
stopping the production of forecasts. By adding our dummy variable 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, we 
observe once again that an experienced analyst has a lower chance of job-termination 
than younger analysts. However, an analyst that is experienced but performed weakly 
and boldly in the past has a probability 7.5% higher of job-termination than an 
inexperienced analyst with better scores in accuracy and audacity. Finally, we find that 
being accurate and experienced reduces an analyst’s probability of job-termination by 
around 4.2 percentage points, while we observe no difference in the effect of audacity 
for young or old analysts.  
E. Employment outcome and forecast behaviors by all-star status 
On a yearly basis many rankings of individual sell-side analysts are published in 
the U.S. Hence, we consider the ranking provided by the Institutional Investor magazine 
in our analysis. The Institutional Investor magazine is not only known for its high-
quality financial publications but also its rankings are seen as industry benchmarks 
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among financial experts. One of these rankings is the All-America Research Team, an 
annual ranking that identifies the best sell-side analysts in the U.S. since 1972. Most 
sell-side analysts aspire to be part of this team.
6
 In addition, previous literature has 
identified better earnings forecast accuracy, smaller optimism bias and higher stock 
recommendation returns for these influential analysts, also known as all-stars (Leone 
and Wu (2007)). Hence, we study the relation between employment outcomes and 
forecast performance conditional on an analyst being an all-star for the period of 1997 
to 2013. Our analysis only comprises this period because we hand-collected the data 
from Institutional Investor Magazine and we only have access to this ranking starting in 
the year of 1997. Moreover we consider all the analysts in this ranking, i.e., first, 
second, third and runner-ups, as all-stars. We provide a comparison of this group of all-
stars with our total sample and observe to which extent our results differ in respect to 
job-termination and related career prospects.  
 For the all-stars scope, it is possible that an analyst’s forecast accuracy is unlikely 
to be rewarded per se, since this feature is already implicit in the recognition of being 
considered part of the All-American Research Team. Thus, for non-all-star analysts 
with positive past behaviors we anticipate a significant increase in the likelihood of 
keeping the job or being upgraded. Otherwise, for all-stars, accuracy is already one 
dimension intrinsic to their status, among other features, so for this reason we only 
analyze the likelihood of job-termination.  
                                                          
6
 For the selection of the members of the annual All-America Research Team the Institutional 
Investor delivers questionnaires to the top institutions of the buy-side of Wall Street (e.g. directors of 
research and of major money management firms, analysts and other portfolio managers). The 
participants rank the analysts according to the following 12 dimensions: Integrity and 
professionalism, industry knowledge, accessibility and responsiveness, special services, written 
reports, management access, useful and timely calls, local market and country knowledge, financial 
models, idea generation, research delivery and earnings estimates. The yearly October issue of the 
magazine contains the results. 
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We estimate a similar equation to Equation (5), plus 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 and a variable 
entitled 𝑎𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and an interaction term with the forecast measure. 𝐴𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is 
one if the analyst is an all-star and zero otherwise. We consider as dependent variable 
the analyst being terminated because most of the all-stars in our sample work already in 
a high-status house. 
 
 
Table IV 
Forecast Performance, All-Stars and the Likelihood of Job-Termination 
This table presents records for the impact of analysts’ past forecast performance on their future 
probability of experiencing job-termination, depending on whether analysts are all-stars from 
1997 to 2013. Being an all-star implies that an analyst is part of the All-America Research Team 
in a given year. We consider analysts’ past earnings forecasts to compute the forecast accuracy 
and audacity scores. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is job-termination - analysts 
stop producing forecasts to I/B/E/S in the year to follow. The regressions are Equations (5) and 
(6). The standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
  Job-Termination 
   (1) (2) 
Accuracy (bottom 10%) .0171*** .0155*** 
 
(.0059) (.0057) 
All-star -.0897***  
 
(.0068) 
 
Accuracy × All-star  -.0281 
 
 
(.0240) 
 
Audacity (top 10%)  
.0352*** 
 
 
(.0060) 
Audacity × All-star indicator  
-.0325 
 
 
(.0210) 
Observations 31,982 31,982 
 
In column (1) of Table IV we observe that for analysts that are non-all-stars, being in 
the 10
th
 percentile of the forecast accuracy score increases the likelihood of leaving the 
sample by around 2%. Moreover, the coefficient on the all-star term is negative and 
statistical significant, denoting that all-stars are 9% less likely to leave the job than any 
other analyst. Finally, the interaction estimate indicates that weak accuracy is less 
relevant for all-stars. If an analyst has the all-star status, being in the 10
th
 percentile of 
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the accuracy score reduces an analyst’s likelihood of being terminated by around 3% 
compared to other analysts also with low scores on accuracy. 
We estimate Equation (6) plus the analyst feature 𝑎𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and an interaction 
term. Column (2) of Table IV presents the estimates, indicating how job-termination 
varies with audacity for all-star analysts. Non-all-star analysts in the 10
th
 percentile of 
the forecast audacity ranking have a 3.5% higher probability of job-termination. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative, indicating that an all-star analyst on the 
top 10% of the audacity score is less likely to be terminated than her counterparts, but is 
not statistically significant. 
F. Employment outcome and forecast behaviors by sample periods 
Additionally it is also interesting to observe how the association between 
employment outcomes and past forecast performance has varied over time. Previous 
literature argues that analysts face different incentives regarding accuracy and audacity 
when producing earnings forecasts since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, after the 
implementation by the SEC of a set of ‘fair disclosure’ regulations that aim to stop the 
practice of selective publication (Agrawal et al. (2006)), leading analysts to change their 
practices. 
To observe the reward for an analysts’ strong performance in the period between 
2003 and 2013 and earlier periods, we use the same regression as in Section IV B. 
(Equation (5) plus 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖). We add a variable entitled 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 2003𝑖 and an 
interactive variable with the forecast measures. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 2003𝑖  is equivalent to one if the 
estimation is from the year of 2003 and onwards, zero otherwise. 
Column (1) of Table V presents the estimates considering as the dependent variable 
an analyst experiencing job-termination. An analyst that performs weakly in forecasting 
i.e. is in the 10
th
 percentile of the accuracy rank, in the period before 2003 is 3% more 
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likely to experience job-termination than her counterparts. The estimate on the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant, meaning that weak performance 
is less relevant for the likelihood of job-termination for the group of analysts producing 
forecast between 2004 and 2013. An analyst in the 10
th
 percentile of the accuracy 
ranking from 2003 onwards, has a likelihood of job-termination 4% lower, comparing 
to the earliest period. Both coefficients are statistically significant. We conclude that 
accuracy is less relevant for employment outcomes in 2004 to 2013 than in previous 
periods. 
 
Table V 
Forecast Performance, Sub-Periods and the Likelihood of Employment Outcome 
This table presents records for the impact of analysts’ past forecast performance on their future 
employment outcome for the periods of 1987 to 2003 and 2003 to 2013. We consider analysts’ 
past earnings forecasts to compute the forecast accuracy and audacity scores. In columns (1) and 
(2) the dependent variable is job-termination - analysts stop producing forecasts to I/B/E/S in the 
year to follow. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is job-upgrade – analysts move to 
a high-status brokerage in the year to follow. The regressions are Equations (5) and (6). The 
standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
        Job-Termination   Job-Upgrade 
        (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Accuracy (bottom 10%) .0295***   
.0004 
 
    
(.0095) 
  
(.0041) 
 
Accuracy × After 2003 -.0392***   
-.0044 
 
    
(.0121) 
  
(.0051) 
 
Audacity (top 10%) 
 
 
.0471*** 
  
-.0020 
    
 
(.0069) 
  
(.0030) 
Audacity × After 2003  
-.0514*** 
  
.0133*** 
    
 
(.0126) 
  
(.0053) 
Observations     31,982 31,982   28,590 28,590 
 
We also observe the evolution of the sensitivity of employment outcomes to 
audacity over time. We estimate Equation (6) and add again the indicator 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 2003𝑖. 
In column (2) of Table V the dependent variable is again whether an analyst leaves the 
job. Analysts producing earnings forecasts in the period before 2003 that are in the 90
th
 
percentile of the forecast audacity score are about 5% more likely to experience job-
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termination. Thus, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that audacity is more important to avoid an analyst’s likelihood of 
experiencing job-termination in the most recent years, from 2004 to 2013. For an 
analyst producing forecasts in the period of 2004 to 2013, being in the top of the 
audacity ranking reduces her likelihood of leaving the sample by about 5 percentage 
points.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table V we perform the same regression specifications as 
in columns (1) and (2) respectively now considering an analyst’s job-upgrade the 
dependent variable. Overall, an analyst in the top decile of the accuracy score is less 
likely to be upgraded in a more recent period than before the year of 2003. The estimate 
is neither economically nor statistically significant. In respect to the forecast audacity 
behavior, an analyst in the 90
th
 percentile of the audacity score is 1% more likely to 
experience job-upgrade in the 2004 to 2013 period than before.  
We conclude that from 2004 onwards forecast accuracy has less importance on the 
probability of job-termination and job-upgrade, while being bolder slightly indicates an 
increased likelihood of job-upgrade for the same period. Our results indicate a slight 
change in the relationship between forecast behaviors and employment outcomes after 
the year of 2003. Thus, the observed change in analysts’ outcome-performance 
relationship may not only be influenced by the impact of new regulation in the early 
2000’s, but also by other reasons that we do not include in our research. 
 
V. Conclusions 
In our study we analyze the relation between employment outcome and the 
earnings forecasts of U.S. sell-side analysts submitted to I/B/E/S. We draw the 
following conclusions from our research.  
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When examining the impact of analysts’ past performance on employment 
outcome we conclude that, contrary to financial press and regulators judgments, an 
analyst’s career outcome is influenced by her ability to produce accurate earnings 
forecasts. In addition, controlling for forecast accuracy, an analyst’s tendency to diverge 
from the average forecasts (i.e. produce bold forecasts) is also considered by investment 
firms when defining analysts’ future outcome. Especially, analysts producing bold 
forecasts are more likely to experience job-termination. Moreover, we also find that 
inexperienced and experienced analysts have distinct incentives. Analysts performing 
weakly, i.e. with less accurate or bolder forecasts, but with experience are less likely to 
experience job-termination than inexperienced analysts. Thus, while past performance is 
a strong indicator of analysts’ forecasting ability for the youngest, with experience 
analysts’ ability may be assessed differently.  
Furthermore, we identify in our sample of I/B/E/S analysts a group of all-stars. We 
analyze the impact of forecast performance, both accuracy and audacity, on the 
likelihood of job-termination and observe that this impact is absent for all-stars. We 
conclude that all-stars are less likely to experience job-termination than our regular 
sample of analysts. Thus, our results can be justified by the fact that, most likely, 
accuracy is already implicit and expected in a forecast of an all-star, hence other 
characteristics may impact the career outcome of the latter. The possibility of acquiring 
a larger sample of all-stars and deepen our analysis on the latter is a conjecture to 
consider on a further research. 
Finally we find evidence that with the implementation of new regulation in the 
early 2000’s, job-termination becomes less sensitive to precision and job-upgrade 
slightly more sensitive to audacity. The regulations introduced in the years between 
2000 and 2003 were mostly aimed at putting an end on several conflicts of interest 
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between firms, investment banks and other participants in the Wall Street, culminating 
with the Global Settlement of 2003. The diminishing impact of forecast accuracy on 
employment outcome, namely job-termination, after the implementation of the 
regulation measures is an interesting topic both from an academic and policy 
perspective. While in our analysis we divide the sample in two periods and point out the 
asymmetries in the outcome-performance relationship before and after the year of 2003; 
there is room for a lot more to be done regarding the different regulations implemented 
since then. We leave this issue for future research. 
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